The class of ''parametric'' methods of apportionment, of rounding, or for minimizing the variation of production rates in just-in-time production systems is characterized in several different ways that depend on the underlying qualitative behavior of its solutions.
Introduction
The motivation for studying parametric methods is threefold. To begin they play an important role in electoral systems. In Japan the debate on what method should be chosen to apportion the 512 seats of its Diet seems to have concentrated on parametric methods (Balinski, 1993; Oyama, 1991) . In Spain the House of Representatives is elected by a system of proportional representation at the level of its provinces. Recent experience has shown that this has strongly and increasingly favored solidly implanted provincial political parties at the expense of the nation-wide parties of similar or smaller size -indeed, so much so that one party, the Catalonian CiU (Convergencia i Union) party, has held the balance of power since 1993, permitting the socialists (Partidõ Socialista Obrero Espanol) to govern from 1993 to 1996, and then permitting the right (Partido Popular) to govern since 1996. This has sparked a considerable debate on what should be done that is regularly nourished by electoral data. The data naturally evoked a desirable property that a method of apportionment should have, which it turns out is met only by the class of parametric methods. More generally, political scientists have for years talked about the ''thresholds'' of votes that will assure a party of representation in a proportional representation system (see, Lijphart, 1994; Rae, 1971) : an answer to this question leads to yet another characterization of parametric methods. This is the ''apportionment'' part of the title.
The term ''rounding'' refers to a second motivation. Given a list of real numbers the sum of their roundings may well differ from the rounding of their sum. For example, newspapers usually give the percentages of the votes won by each of a set of competing candidates along with the actual vote totals, and they often fail to add to 100%. Another current example comes with the introduction of the new common European Union currency, the ''euro'', expected to be introduced on January 1, 1999. There will be a period of transition in which financial transactions in banks will be given in the two currencies of a participating country, the old and the new: e.g., in France, the franc and the euro (Ministere de l'Economie et des Finances, 1997) . Sums of roundings will often differ from the rounding of the sum, and though each single problem represents practically nothing, the discrepancies summed over all problems could bring significant windfall gains (or losses) due to the sheer number of transactions. Two questions present themselves (Balinski, 1996) . The first has been addressed elsewhere (Balinski and Rachev, 1993) : if one accepts the idea that sums of percentages may differ from 100%, what ''rule'' of rounding should be used? The second is of concern here: if one insists that the sums must always be exactly 100%, what ''method'' should be used (Balinski and Rachev, 1997) ? A particularly desirable property for methods of rounding distinguishes the class of parametric methods (called ''stationary'' in Balinski and Rachev, 1997) among the far wider class of ''divisor'' methods.
There is an extensive literature on minimizing the variation of production rates in ''just-in-time'' systems (e.g., Balinski and Shahidi, 1997; Bautista et al., 1996; Kubiak, 1993; Miltenburg, 1989; Steiner and Yeomans, 1993) . In one guise -the ''product rate variation'' problem -it is formally equivalent to the problem of apportionment, though what constitutes a ''good'' solution must of course be evaluated in the context of the actual problem. A particularly appealing property, often discussed in the literature (when praising the qualities of a particular method or type of solution) -to wit, that an optimal sequence in the production of different products should eventually repeat or cycleonce again elects parametric methods as the only ones that meet the test. This is the third motivation, and the reason for the existence of the word ''production'' in the title.
The answer to the question, ''why a parametric method?'' depends on the inherent context of the problem to be treated, but several different fundamental properties, persuasive in different contexts, yield the same methods: they are the subject of this paper.
The problem
A problem is defined by any pair ( p, h), where p 5 ( p ) . 0, j [ S, is a nonzero j vector of reals, S a finite set, and h . 0 a positive integer. The dimension of the problem is uSu 5 s. A solution for the problem ( p, h) is a vector of positive integers x 5 (x ) $ 0,
x 5h.
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A method f is a point to set mapping that assigns at least one solution to each problem.
In apportionment, p are the populations of s states or provinces (or the vote totals of political parties) and x the total number of seats each is to be allocated, which must sum to h. The goal is to find solutions that are as ''fair'' as possible, the unattainable ideal being proportionality.
In rounding, p are data that are to be rounded and x the roundings, whose sum must equal h (e.g. h5100%). The aim here is to find solutions that in some probabilistic sense best ''represent'' the vectors p.
In the product rate variation or PRV problem, p are the relative demands for s products to be produced (so p 51) and x the cumulative production through period h.
S
Here it is assumed that producing one item of any product requires one period and that Dp is integer valued for some integer D .0: what is wanted is the order of production in succeeding periods, so a solution is necessary for every value of h, 0#h#D. For the PRV problem an order of production is sought that best maintains cumulative productions over the D periods that come ''closest'' to being proportional to the rates of production.
Divisor and parametric methods
There is a particularly rich history of methods in the context of apportionment (see Balinski and Young, 1982) . Most, though not all, of the specific methods proposed or used belong to a class called ''divisor'' methods.
A divisor function d is any monotone real valued function defined over the nonnegative integers that satisfies d (k) [[k, k11] for all integers k, and for which there exists no pair of integers a$0 and b$1 with d(a)5a11 and
Thus [d(a)] 5a or a11: at the threshold one can either round up or down. An equivalent definition is the min-max condition p p The lemma that follows is trivial to verify.
Due to lemma 1, Table 1 gives all of the parametric method solutions for the problem ( p, h), where p is the vector of votes received by the respective parties in the 1993 Spanish elections and h5350 is the number of seats in its lower house. The quotas of a problem ( p, h) are given by the vector q5hp /p : it is the exact proportional vector that 
This definition is well known in the literature (see Balinski and Young, 1982 page 118) : it formalizes the idea of one method favoring the bigger as versus the smaller parties. Think of ''gives-up'' in terms of seats being ''given-up'' by the smaller parties, as the method is changed from f to f*, in favor of the bigger parties . . . that are further ''up'' on the list of parties! In the context of parametric (as versus the more general divisor) methods this concept permits the characterization given in the following lemma. Proof. Consider a problem ( p, h),
Thus, the parametric method f that is most favorable to the smaller parties is that with the smallest d, namely d 50; and that most favorable to the bigger parties is that with the largest d, namely d 51.
The well known method of Hamilton (sometimes called that of Hare), used for apportionment at various times in various countries including France, Israel, Mexico and the USA, stands, in view of its properties, in opposition to the class of divisor methods. It is easily described: (i) for each i set x 5[q ] ; (ii) then increase by 1 each x that There may, of course, be several solutions (when some of the remainders are the same).
Properties of methods
The three most fundamental properties that a method for any of the three problems should enjoy are as follows. First, scale-invariancy: f( p, h)5f(lp, h) for every l.0. The problem is the same no matter what scale is used in presenting it. Second, exactness: if p is integer valued and o p 5h then p is the unique solution, f( p, h)5p.
If there is no ''problem'' then there is no problem! Third, anonymity: solutions depend only on the values of the data, i.e., they are independent of the order in which the data is presented. Every method must realize these three demands. In particular, divisor methods as well as Hamilton's method satisfy these properties. Arguably the most important ''nonobvious'' property concerning methods is that they be ''consistent''. In all of the applications of problems ( p, h) the ''ideal'' solution is the proportional one. The fundamental underlying property of proportionality is that any part of a proportional solution is itself proportional. To make this precise, if J is some subset of S, J ,S, and J is its complement, denote the corresponding subvectors of p by p(J) nd p(J ), and similarly for x, and write x5(x(J), x(J )) and p5( p(J), p(J )) (modulo a rearrangement of the order of the indices which, by anonymity, is of no consequence). Any part of a best apportionment, rounding or production schedule should itself be a best apportionment, rounding or production schedule. It is at once evident that every divisor method, so every parametric method, is consistent. On the other hand, simple examples show that Hamilton's method is not consistent. Indeed, consistency is a strong property. We begin by deducing several of its consequences.
A method f is balanced if x[( p, h) and p 5p implies ux 2x u#1. f(( p , p ), x 1x 11), so by consistency the first of these solutions may be substituted 1 2 1 2 in (3) to obtain
Repeating one obtains * 9 * 9 * 9 with x 1x 5x 1x and x 1tx 5x 1tx , so x 5x and x 5x . j 
Corollary. If a method f is consistent, balanced and anonymous then
for any integers t , t .0.
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Nevertheless, consistency (together with anonymity, exactness and invariancy) is not sufficient to characterize the divisor methods, as shown by the following example. For all k$0 and integer, define
and consider the method
It is easy to verify that the method c meets the properties of scale-invariancy, exactness and anonymity, and it is clearly consistent: but it is not a divisor method. A method is responsive if
Theorem 1 (Balinski and Young, 1982, 1977) .
f is a divisor method if and only if it is consistent, exact, anonymous, scale-invariant and responsive.
This theorem characterizes the class of divisor methods, and opens the door to a host of characterizations of individual methods, but how and why the parametric methods constitute a class of their own has remained an open question.
Cyclic characterization
In the contexts of production scheduling and of rounding a cyclic property seems to be particularly compelling. Suppose, for example, that the relative demands for two
products are p5 ( , ) and that a method f yields f(( , ), 5)5(1, 4 same order of production should repeat, so it should be true that f(( , ), 30)5(7, 25 25 18)1(1, 4)5 (8, 22) . And the same remark seems reasonable in the context of rounding. For apportionment, however, the property seems uninteresting: by the very nature of the problem, h is very small as compared with the large values of the vector p.
A method is cyclic if
S
Hamilton's method, for example, is clearly cyclic.
Theorem 2. A divisor method f is parametric if and only if it is cyclic.
Proof. To see that a parametric method is cyclic it suffices by (2) 
A similar construction handles the case d *.d. j
In the PRV problem, the aim is that the cumulative productions at each period be approximately proportional to the rates of demand. By and large the approach found in the literature is to postulate a measure of disproportionality or of error and so turn the problem into a sequence of minimization problems, one for each period. Most papers impose a measure yielding solutions identical to those given by the method of Hamilton. But this leads to an unfortunate difficulty since Hamilton's method is not increasing: it is possible for the cumulative production to decrease in going from one period to the next! Thus the main effort has been to devise heuristics or other involved algorithms to guarantee a feasible solution (which may or may not be cyclic). No attention has been given to the idea that perhaps another objective function would do better: indeed, there are infinite numbers of measures of disproportionality that one could use, but little to nothing on why one is better than another. Cyclicity is a powerful reason for choosing to minimize a measure of error whose solutions belong to parametric methods. The fact is
This makes it tempting to chose the parametric method based on d 51 / 2. In fact there is a persuasive reason for this choice: it is the unique parametric method for which the average cumulative production of each product i over the full cycle of D periods is exactly equal to one-half of its total demand Dp (see Balinski and Shahidi, 1997) . So
is the unique parametric method that achieves ''proportionality'' over the entire production cycle.
Remainder characterizations
In Spain's Parliament each province (or state) is allocated a certain number of deputies, on the basis of its population, and within each province parties are allocated seats according to their vote totals within the province by the method of Jefferson 1 (known in Europe as the method of d'Hondt), f . For example, in the 1989 elections the results within the province of Barcelona, which elects 32 deputies, were as in Table 2 .
Lemma 2 shows that among the parametric methods -and this is true as well among the class of all divisor methods -the method of Jefferson (or d'Hondt) is the most favorable for the large parties, the least favorable for the small parties. In the interest of reducing this advantage, and so obtaining a more ''equitable'' apportionment, the idea of 1 / 2 using Webster's method (or Sainte-Lague's), f , was considered. The example of Table 2 immediately fuelled the arguments against: why should the PP receive 4 seats ''for'' 3 and a remainder of 0.72 and the CDS 2 ''for'' 1 and a remainder of 0.60, whereas the CiU only receives 10 ''for'' 10 and a remainder of 0.74? This suggests two possible properties.
Letting q 5hp /p 5n 1r , n $0 and integer, a method f respects remainders at d if
The idea is that if party k receives more seats than its quota and its ''claim'' to an extra seat on the basis of its remainder r is at most d, whereas another party l's ''claim'' on k In this case the concept of respecting remainders takes on a more ''realistic'' cast (if realism coincides with the weight of the bigger parties that might induce the choice of a method that satisfies the property): if some party receives more seats than its quota ''for'' a remainder of r, then only the bigger parties who have larger remainders are guaranteed to receive more seats than their quotas (see the CiU in Table 2 ). Proof. Suppose d $12(1 /s) and let i, j be a pair satisfying p .p , r .r . If r ,d,
showing that f gives [q ] 11 seats to i before it gives [q ] 11 seats to j. 
This means state 1 receives its quota rounded-down, state 2 its quota rounded-up. j
Threshold characterizations
A great deal of attention has been given to ''thresholds of representation'' in the political science literature (Lijphart, 1994; Rae, 1971) . This concerns problems of apportionment ( p, h), where p represents the votes of parties (as in the example of the previous section). The questions are these: when is a party assured of at least one deputy? and when is a party denied any representation whatsoever? An answer leads to yet other characterizations of parametric methods.
An Theorems 5 and 6 below characterize parametric methods f in terms of upper and lower bounds on the number of seats each single party i receives given as functions of its percentage of the vote, the number of seats to be distributed, the number of parties in competition and the value of d [[0, 1] . The upper bound answers the question: when is the party denied any representation whatsoever (or is denied any given total number of seats). The lower bound answers the question: when is the party sure to have at least one seat (or is guaranteed any given total number of seats). And in the ''gaps'' in between there is a doubt. An example below illustrates how these theorems may be used. Since d both characterize the parametric method f the bounds are the best possible (for some problem at least one inequality must be tight). On the other hand, there may be other upper and lower bound functions that do the job differently. 
is the parametric method f .
Proof. Suppose f is an anonymous and consistent method that satisfies the upper bound conditions (4), and let p 5p /p . When a party has a percentage of the vote that falls in the gap between 1.45% and 1.69% of the vote and h532 seats are to be distributed among s55 parties by the method of Webster the result is uncertain: it may receive either 0 or 1 seat (and similarly for other parametric methods and other gaps).
The interest of these characterizations is that they are sparse and simple: only anonymity and consistency together with the bounds are required, and the proofs are relatively straightforward (and much simpler than those required to characterize the more general class of divisor methods).
